

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 089227
ORIGIN EUR-12

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TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY
INFO AMCONSUL ISTANBUL
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USNATO
AMCONSUL ADANA
AMCONSUL IZMIR
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USDOCOSOUTH
USNMR SHAPE
USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR
USCINCEUR
CINCUSAFE

UNCLAS STATE 089227

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS:PEPR, MASS,GR, CY, TU

SUBJECT: ADMINISTRATION TESTIMONY ON GREECE, TURKEY AND
UNCLASSIFIED

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CYPRUS BEFORE HIRC

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT OF HAROLD BROWN, SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMIT-
TEE, ON FY 1979 SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE, TURKEY
AND CYPRUS, APRIL 6, 1978.

BEGIN TEXT: TURKEY AND GREECE ARE MORE TO US THAN NATO
ALLIES, VALUABLE AS THAT IS. THEY ARE IMPORTANT MEMBERS OF
THE WESTERN FAMILY OF NATIONS. THEY ARE VALUED FRIENDS.

THEY ARE NATIONS WHERE DEMOCRACY HAS BEEN TESTED AND IS STRONGER FOR THEIR PEOPLE KNOWING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND LACKING DEMOCRACY. FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS WE HAVE WATCHED WITH CONCERN THE STEADY DETERIORATION IN THE COHESION AND STRENGTH OF THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO. THERE ARE TENSIONS IN US BILATERAL RELATIONS WHICH GREECE AND TURKEY, GREAT STRAINS BETWEEN THESE TWO NATO ALLIES, AN ESTRANGEMENT IN GREEK RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF THE ALLIANCE, AND AN EROSION IN THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES, ALL OF WHICH HURT OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY GOALS.

SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION HAS NOT YET BEEN ACHIEVED, AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY OVER AEGEAN SEABED

AND AIR SPACE ISSUES HAVE NOT YET BEEN RESOLVED. JUST AND ENDURING AGREEMENTS ON ALL THESE PROBLEMS MUST BE REACHED AMONG THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED. BUT WE CANNOT STAND BACK AND ALLOW THE RISKS TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT AND TO COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN TO GROW WHILE SETTLEMENT EFFORTS CONTINUE. THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, OF NATO, AND PARTICULARLY OF GREECE AND TURKEY DEMAND THAT PROMPT STEPS BE TAKEN TO UNCLASSIFIED

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PUT OUR RELATIONS WITH THOSE NATIONS BACK ON FOUNDATIONS OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TRUST.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE RECOGNIZED THE IMPORTANCE TO US OF GREECE AND TURKEY. IN 1947 PRESIDENT TRUMAN SAID, "SHOULD WE FAIL TO AID GREECE AND TURKEY IN THIS FATEFUL HOUR, THE EFFECTS WILL BE FAR REACHING TO THE WEST AS WELL AS TO THE EAST. WE MUST TAKE IMMEDIATE AND RESOLUTE ACTION." A MASSIVE INFUSION OF ASSISTANCE FOLLOWED AND THE AGGREGATE US ECONOMIC AND SECURITY INVESTMENT IN GREECE AND TURKEY SINCE THEN HAS BEEN ALMOST DOLS 11 BILLION. THAT HAS, MORE THAN THRITY YEARS LATER, PROVED TO BE A SUCCESS. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE DEMOCRACIES. BOTH ARE ECONOMICALLY BETTER OFF THAN EVER BEFORE. UNTIL RECENT YEARS, BOTH WERE FULLY PART OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEMS THAT HAS PRESERVED THOSE VALUES. THIS EFFORT AND SUPPORT WAS WELL SPENT. IT REPRESENTS AN INVESTMENT IN US SECURITY, THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE, AND THE SECURITY OF TWO NATIONS WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO EACH OTHER, AS WELL AS TO US.

JOINT DEFENSE AGAINST THE COMMON THREAT IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN IS VITAL NOT ONLY TO GREECE AND TURKEY, BUT ALSO TO THE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THAT REGION. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE SITUATED SO AS TO INHIBIT SOVIET ADVENTURISM IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS WELL AS THE MIDDLE EAST. BOTH COUNTRIES FIELD ARMED FORCES WHICH ARE NOT ONLY NECESSARY

TO THEIR OWN DEFENSE, BUT WHICH ALSO TIE DOWN WARSAW PACT FORCES WHICH COULD OTHERWISE BE CONCENTRATED AGAINST OTHER AREAS OF NATO. BOTH COUNTRIES PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR NATO FORWARD TACTICAL-OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES. BOTH ALSO PROVIDE SITES FOR OTHER US ACTIVITIES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE NATO MISSION AND REGIONAL SECURITY.

THAT GREECE AND TURKEY NEED THE PROTECTION OF NATO, AND THAT NATO NEEDS BOTH THESE COUNTRIES, IS THE FOUNDATION OF UNCLASSIFIED

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THEIR TWENTY-SEVEN YEARS OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE ALLIANCE. BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THAT BOTH COUNTRIES NEED EACH OTHER AS WELL. THE ABSENCE OF ONE FROM NATO WOULD BE PROFOUNDLY DETRIMENTAL TO BOTH. WITHOUT TURKEY IN NATO,

GREECE WOULD STAND EXPOSED PRACTICALLY ON ALL SIDES. WARSAW PACT FORCES WOULD FACE THE SIMPLIFIED TASK OF CONCENTRATING ON ONLY ONE FRONT, NORTHERN GREECE AND GREEK THRACE, WITHOUT FEAR OF A FLANK EXPOSED TO TURKEY.

TURKISH FAILURE TO RESTRICT THE TRANSIT OF SOVIET COMBATANT SHIPS THROUGH THE STRAITS IN WARTIME COULD FORCE NATO TO CONTEND WITH MUCH GREATER SOVIET SEA POWER IN THE OPEN AEGEAN - A COSTLY AND COMPLICATED PROPOSITION. LACK OF ACCESS TO TURKISH PORTS WOULD ALSO IMPACT ON US SIXTH FLEET OPERATIONS, INCLUDING CONTROL OF SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH THE MEDITERRANEAN TO THE ATLANTIC.

WITHOUT GREEK PARTICIPATION IN NATO, TURKEY WOULD BE PHYSICALLY ISOLATED FROM ITS NEAREST NATO ALLY BY 700 MILES AND ITS EARLY WARNING AND COMMUNICATIONS LINKS WITH NATO, WHICH NOW PASS THROUGH GREECE, WOULD BE WEAKENED. WARSAW PACT FORCES COULD ASSAIL THE TURKISH STRAITS UNIMPEDED BY THREATS OF A GREEK FLANK ATTACK. GREEK NAVAL FORCES WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO HELP COUNTER SOVIET FORCES MOVING IN FROM THE BLACK SEA. A NON-ALIGNED GREECE WOULD COMPLICATE ALLIED OPERATIONS IN THE AEGEAN BOTH IN PEACE AND WARTIME.

CLOSE AND WARM BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES WERE FOR MANY YEARS THE FOUNDATION OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH PARTNERSHIP WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THOSE RELATIONS UNCLASSIFIED

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HAVE BEEN UNDERMINED BY UNSETTLING EVENTS SINCE 1974, AND EXACERBATED BY WHAT HAS NOW BECOME A SELF-DEFEATING EMBARGO ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE NATO STRUCTURE IN THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK HAS BEEN

DISRUPTED AND THE CAPABILITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF GREECE AND TURKEY TO REACT QUICKLY AND EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE COMMON THREAT HAS BEEN DIMINISHED. INDEED, THE VERY CHARACTER OF FUTURE GREEK AND TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NATO HAS BEEN BROUGHT INTO QUESTION.

IN THE WAKE OF 1974 EVENTS IN CYPRUS, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WITHDREW ITS FORCES FROM THE NATO INTEGRATED MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURE. A PERSISTENCE OF THIS CONDITION HAS CREATED SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR NATO PLANNERS AND LOOSENED THE COHESION OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK. WE HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT ON-GOING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND NATO WILL RESULT IN THE RESUMPTION OF FULL GREEK MILITARY PARTICIPATION.

WHILE TURKEY REMAINS A FULL MEMBER OF NATO, ITS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN ITS DEFENSIVE FORCES ADEQUATELY IS DIMINISHING

THE ARMS EMBARGO IMPOSED BY THE US IN 1975, AND CONTINUING RESTRICTIONS ON US SECURITY ASSISTANCE, HAVE HAD DEBILITATING EFFECTS; EFFECTS WHICH ARE AGGRAVATED BECAUSE TURKEY IS ALSO SUFFERING MAJOR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. THIS COMBINATION HAS NOT ONLY PREVENTED NEEDED TURKISH MODERNIZATION EFFORTS, BUT HAS ALSO MADE QUITE DIFFICULT THE MAINTENANCE OF AGING AMERICAN-MADE EQUIPMENT IN TURKEY. THE OTHER NATO ALLIES SHARE OUR CONCERN OVER THE STATE OF THE SECOND LARGEST STANDING MILITARY FORCE IN NATO. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD OF COURSE PREFER TO FACE WEAKER FORCES ALONG THE ALMOST TWO THOUSAND MILES OF COMMON BORDER IT SHARES WITH TURKEY.

TURKEY VIEWS US SECURITY ASSISTANCE AS EVIDENCE OF OUR UNCLASSIFIED

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INTENT TO CONTINUE AS A STABLE AND DEPENDABLE ALLY OF THAT COUNTRY. UNLESS OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY IS RETURNED TO A SOUND FOOTING, TURKEY'S SENSE OF ISOLATION WILL CONTINUE TO GROW AND NATIONALISTIC PRESSURES WILL EDGE IT TOWARD A SEARCH FOR POSSIBLE NON-NATO SOURCES TO SATISFY ITS DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS. SUCH AN EVENTUALITY WE JUDGE, WOULD NOT BE IN TURKEY'S BEST INTERESTS, MUCH LESS OUR INTEREST, THE INTERESTS OF NATO, OR THOSE OF GREECE.

THE US MILITARY PRESENCE IN GREECE AND TURKEY, WHICH SERVES OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY GOALS, HAS ALSO BEEN AFFECTED BY THE EVENTS OF RECENT YEARS.

IN GREECE, RESTRICTIONS WERE PLACED ON US MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE SUMMER OF 1974. FORTUNATELY, WE HAVE OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM AND EXISTING US MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THAT COUNTRY ARE FUNCTIONING AS BEFORE.

IN TURKEY, OUR SITUATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT AND QUITE DIFFICULT AS A RESULT OF TURKISH REACTIONS TO THE 1975 EMBARGO. TURKEY ABROGATED THE DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT THEN IN EFFECT, SUSPENDED US ACTIVITIES AT THE FIVE MAJOR INSTALLATIONS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO NATO, ASSUMED ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OVER ALL US INSTALLATIONS, AND WITHDREW MANY PRIVILEGES PREVIOUSLY AFFORDED TO THE US FORCES. THIS STATUS CONTINUES TODAY. US ACTIVITIES DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE NATO MISSION WERE NOT AFFECTED.

THE SUSPENSION OF US ACTIVITIES AT THE FIVE INSTALLATIONS HAS NOT ONLY CAUSED US INCONVENIENCE, IT HAS RESULTED IN THE LOSS OF SOME INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION NOT AVAILABLE FROM OTHER SOURCES. WE HAVE COMPENSATED TO SOME DEGREE

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FOR THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT WE WOULD WISH TO RESUME

MOST OF OUR PREVIOUS ACTIVITIES IF AND WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT.

I CANNOT EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY MY VIEW THAT BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY SHARE EQUAL IMPORTANCE AND EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY IN MAINTAINING COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE REGION. THE US, IN ITS OWN INTERESTS, AS WELL AS THOSE OF THE ALLIANCE, MUST CONTINUE TO HELP BOTH COUNTRIES MEET THESE RESPONSIBILITIES. IN DEFENSE TERMS, THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSALS, AS PRESENTED BY SECRETARY VANCE, REPRESENT VERY IMPORTANT STEPS TOWARD STRENGTHENING NATO'S SOUTH-EASTERN FLANK. I VIEW THE PROPOSED REPEAL OF THE EMBARGO AS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. THE ENACTMENT OF THE EMBARGO AS SECRETARY VANCE INDICATED, DEMONSTRATED THAT US ARMS CANNOT BE USED IN AN UNAUTHORIZED WAY. THAT POINT WILL BE NO CLEARER IF THE EMBARGO IS LEFT IN EFFECT. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT IS LEFT IN EFFECT IT IS CLEAR THAT THE MILITARY SITUATION IN TURKEY WILL CONTINUE TO DECLINE, AND OUR INTERESTS ON THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO WILL DECLINE ALSO. I URGE YOU, THEREFORE, TO SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION'S FY 1979 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROPOSALS FOR GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS. END TEXT. VANCE

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APPROVED BY:EUR/SE:RCEWING

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UNCLAS STATE 089227

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 089227 ACTION ATHENS, ANKARA, AND NICOSIA INFO ISTANBUL, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LONDON, USNATO, ADANA, IZMIR, BONN, USUN NEW YORK, USDOCOSOUTH, USNMR SHAPE, USDOCOLANDSOUTHEAST IZMIR, USCINCEUR, AND CINCUSAFE DATED APRIL 6, 1978.

QUOTE: UNCLAS STATE 089227

E.O. 11652: N/A

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TAGS: PEPR, MASS, GR, CY, TU, (BROWN, HAROLD)
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Type: TE
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